The Impact of Pre-marital Sex Ratios on Household Saving in Two Asian Countries: The Competitive Saving Motive Revisited by Charles Yuji Horioka & Akiko Terada-Hagiwara
The Impact of Pre-marital Sex Ratios on
Household Saving in Two Asian Countries: The
Competitive Saving Motive Revisited
著者（英） Charles Yuji Horioka, Akiko Terada-Hagiwara
journal or
publication title
AGI Working Paper Series
volume 2016-14
page range 1-37
year 2016-07
URL http://id.nii.ac.jp/1270/00000111/
Creative Commons : 表示 - 非営利 - 改変禁止
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/deed.ja
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Impact of Pre-marital Sex Ratios on Household 
Saving in Two Asian Countries: The Competitive Saving 
Motive Revisited 
 
 
 
Charles Yuji Horioka  
Asian Growth Research Institute 
11-4 Ohtemachi, Kokurakita-ku, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka, Japan 
Akiko Terada-Hagiwara 
Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, Asian 
Development Bank, 
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila 1550, Philippines. 
 
Working Paper Series Vol. 2016-14 
July 2016 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute. 
 
No part of this article may be used reproduced in any manner 
whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief 
quotations embodied in articles and reviews. For information, please 
write to the Institute. 
Asian Growth Research Institute 
 
 
The Impact of Pre-marital Sex Ratios on Household Saving in Two Asian Countries: The Competitive Saving 
Motive Revisited* 
Charles Yuji Horioka** and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara***  
July 5, 2016 
Abstract:  This paper estimates a household saving rate equation for India and Korea using long-term time 
series data for the 1975-2010 period, focusing in particular on the impact of the pre-marital sex ratio on the 
household saving rate.  To summarize the main findings of the paper, it finds that the pre-marital sex (or 
gender) ratio (the ratio of males to females) has a significant impact on the household saving rate in both India 
and Korea, even after controlling for the usual suspects such as the aged and youth dependency ratios and 
income.  It has a negative impact in India, where the bride’s side has to pay substantial dowries to the groom’s 
side at marriage, but a positive impact in Korea, where, as in China, the groom’s side has to bear a 
disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses including purchasing a house or condominium for the 
newlywed couple. 
Key words: Age structure of the population; competitive saving motive; dowries; gender ratio; household saving 
rate; life cycle hypothesis; marriage expenses; pre-marital sex ratio; population control; saving for education; 
saving for marriage; saving rate; sex ratio; son preference; wedding expenses; Korea; India.   
Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: D12, D14, D91, E21, J11, J12, O16 
*We thank Jiro Akita, Chetan Ghate, Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Shikha Jha, Shoshana Grossbard, Tatsuo Hatta, 
Aziz Hayat, Yoshihiko Kadoya, Takamitsu Kurita, Jaewoo Lee, Seunghwan Leem, Debdulal Mallick, Keunkwan 
Ryu, Kwanho Shin, Xueli Tang, Hideki Toya, Shinsuke Uchida, Midori Wakabayashi, Junmin Wan, Shang-Jin 
Wei, Tansel Yilmazer, seminar participants at the Asian Growth Research Institute, Deakin University, 
Fukuoka University, the International Monetary Fund/Bank of Korea Conference on “Asia: Challenges of 
Stability and Growth,” Korea University, Nagoya City University, Seoul National University, Tohoku University, 
and the University of the Philippines, Diliman, two anonymous referees, and especially Yoko Niimi for their 
very helpful comments, Elenita Pura and Shiela Camingue-Romance for superb research assistance, and JSPS 
KAKENHI Grant Number 15H01950, the Asian Growth Research Institute, and the Joint Usage/Research 
Center at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, for their financial support.  The 
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the 
Asian Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. 
**C. Y. Horioka, Asian Growth Research Institute, 11-4, Ohtemachi, Kokurakita-ku, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka 
813-0814, Japan. Email: horioka@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 
USA; Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan 
***A. Terada-Hagiwara, Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, Asian Development Bank, 
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila 1550, Philippines. Email: ahagiwara@adb.org  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As documented by Wei and Zhang (2011a), Du and Wei (2013), and Golley and Tyers 
(2014), the introduction of the one-child policy and other population control measures in 
the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), combined with strong son preference, led 
to an increasingly unbalanced sex (or gender) ratio (ratio of males to females) in the 
pre-marital cohort.  And in two widely cited papers, Wei and Zhang (2011a) and Du and 
Wei (2013) argue that the increasingly unbalanced pre-marital sex ratio, in turn, required 
the groom’s side to save increasingly more to ensure his success in an increasingly 
competitive marriage market and that this elevated the saving rate of the household 
sector as a whole (what they call the “competitive saving motive”). 
 
Wei and Zhang (2011a) and Du and Wei (2013) verify this effect using household-level data 
and provincial panel data for China, cross-country data for a sample of about 160 
countries, and numerical calibration methods and show that the sharp increase in the 
pre-marital sex ratio can potentially explain about 60% of the sharp increase in China’s 
household saving rate during the 1990-2007 period (from 16% to 30%) and about half of 
both the current account surplus of China and the current account deficit of the United 
States (see Wei and Zhang (2015) for a useful survey). 
 
While the “competitive saving motive” may be applicable outside of China given the 
unbalanced sex ratios and conventions regarding marriage-related expenses in other 
countries, empirical investigations have been limited (but see Horioka (1987) for an 
analysis of saving for marriage in Japan).  The purpose of this paper is to contribute to 
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the literature by determining whether or not a similar mechanism has led to a significant 
relationship between the pre-marital sex ratio and the household saving rate in India and 
the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), two countries in which, as in China, sex ratios are 
unbalanced and marriage-related expenses are considerable, and to determine whether or 
not trends over time in the pre-marital sex ratio can explain trends over time in the 
household saving rate in these two countries.  In order to accomplish these objectives, 
this paper estimates a household saving rate equation for India and Korea using 
long-term time series data for the 1975-2010 period, focusing in particular on the impact 
of the pre-marital sex ratio on the household saving rate. 
 
To summarize the main findings of this paper, it finds that the pre-marital sex ratio (ratio 
of males to females) has a significant impact on the household saving rate in India and 
Korea, even after controlling for the usual suspects such as the aged and youth 
dependency ratios and income.  It has a negative impact in India, where the bride’s side 
has to pay substantial dowries to the groom’s side at marriage, but a positive impact in 
Korea, where, as in China, the groom’s side has to bear a disproportionate share of 
marriage-related expenses including purchasing a house or condominium for the 
newlywed couple.  The findings of the paper imply that trends in the pre-marital sex ratio 
can explain trends in the household saving rate during the first half of the sample period 
but not during the second half in both countries and that the level of the pre-marital sex 
ratio can partly explain the high level of Korea’s household saving rate but not the high 
level of India’s household saving rate. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 contains a theoretical 
discussion of the impact of the pre-marital sex ratio on the household saving rate, section 
3 presents and discusses data on trends over time in the pre-marital sex ratio and the 
household saving rate in India and Korea, section 4 presents the estimation model used in 
this paper, section 5 discusses the data sources used, section 6 presents the estimation 
results, and section 7 summarizes, concludes, and explores the policy implications of our 
findings. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical impact of the sex (male-to-female) ratio of the 
pre-marital cohort on the household saving rate (this exposition is based on 
Grossbard-Shechtman (1993), Wei and Zhang (2011a), Du and Wei (2013), and Grossbard 
(2015)).1  If the pre-marital sex ratio is unbalanced, families with a child who belongs to 
the overrepresented gender will presumably increase their saving in order to ensure that 
their child is able to secure an “attractive” spouse, especially if the custom in that country 
is for families with a child who belongs to the overrepresented gender to bear a 
disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses.  At the same time, families with a 
child who belongs to the underrepresented gender may or may not reduce their saving due 
to the presence of two mutually offsetting effects.  On the one hand, they may reduce 
their saving because of their favorable bargaining position in the marriage market, but on 
the other hand, they may increase their saving to ensure that their child does not suffer an 
                                                  
1 See Lafortune (2013) for a very similar analysis of the impact of sex ratios not on the household saving 
rate but on pre-marital educational investments and Wei and Zhang (2011b) for a very similar analysis of 
the impact of sex ratios on the occupational choice of parents. 
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erosion of his or her bargaining power vis-à-vis his or her spouse (assuming that the 
relative wealth levels of the two sides affects the relative bargaining power of the husband 
and wife vis-à-vis one other after marriage).  Thus, families with a child who belongs to 
the overrepresented gender will unambiguously increase their saving, but it is not 
immediately clear whether families with a child who belongs to the underrepresented 
gender will increase or decrease their saving and whether the saving of the household 
sector as a whole will increase or decrease, on balance.   
 
However, Du and Wei (2013) show that a higher pre-marital sex ratio will unambiguously 
raise the saving rate of the household sector as a whole for at least two reasons.  First, 
families with a child who belongs to the overrepresented gender will save more not only 
because of the child’s disadvantaged position in the marriage market but also because they 
know that families with a child who belongs to the underrepresented gender will save less 
due to the child’s advantaged position in the marriage market and want to compensate for 
the reduced saving from the other side.  Thus, the increase in the saving of families with 
a child who belongs to the overrepresented gender will more than offset the decrease in 
the saving of families with a child who belongs to the underrepresented gender.  Second, 
the more unbalanced the pre-marital sex ratio is, the higher will be the proportion of the 
pre-marital cohort that needs to save more for marriage due to its disadvantaged position 
in the marriage market. 
 
These theoretical considerations generate the prediction that the saving rate of the 
household sector as a whole will be lowest when the pre-marital sex ratio is balanced and 
that it will be higher, the more the pre-marital sex ratio is unbalanced in either direction.  
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In other words, the pre-marital sex ratio will have a negative impact on the household 
saving rate if the pre-marital sex ratio is below the biologically normal sex ratio of 1.05 to 
1.06 and a positive impact on the household saving rate if the pre-marital sex ratio is 
above this threshold.  However, as shown later, the pre-marital sex ratio is unbalanced in 
favor of males (exceeds the 1.06 threshold) in both India and Korea (except in Korea 
during the 1975-1983 period).  This implies that we would expect the pre-marital sex 
ratio to have a positive impact on the household saving rate in both countries because the 
groom’s side will have to save more and more as the pre-marital sex ratio increases and 
brides become in increasingly short supply. 
 
However, the foregoing discussion ignores the issue of which side bears the brunt of 
marriage-related expenses, and it is to this issue that we now turn.  Since the custom in 
China is for the groom’s side to bear a disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses 
including purchasing a house or condominium for the newlywed couple, this in turn bid up 
the cost of securing a bride, led families with sons to save more than before, and caused 
the overall household saving rate to increase over time.  Similarly, in the case of Korea, 
the bride’s side is expected to pay a (cash) dowry and to pay for the furnishings of the 
newlywed’s home, but the groom’s side is expected to return half of the dowry and to pay 
for the newlywed’s home, which has become a more and more onerous burden over time 
due to the rapid rise in housing prices (see Onishi (2007)).  Thus, wedding customs in 
Korea are very similar to those in China, with the groom’s side being expected to bear a 
disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses, and moreover, housing prices have 
increased sharply in Korea, as they have in China, thereby further increasing the groom 
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side’s burden.2   
 
By contrast, in the case of India, the bride’s side must pay enormous dowries to the 
groom’s side.  According to Anderson (2007), dowries are paid in 93 to 94% of cases in 
India and amount to 4 to 6 times annual male income, 7 to 8 times annual per capita 
income, and 68% of total household assets before marriage, and the amount of dowries 
increased at the phenomenal rate of 15% per year during the 60-year from 1921 until 1981.  
The Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and it was further strengthened in 1983 
and 2005, but the payment of dowries is still common in many parts of India and the 
aforementioned laws are primarily concerned with preventing and punishing the cruel 
treatment, harassment, and even murder of brides in connection with dowry demands 
rather than with the payment of the dowry itself.  Thus, the situation in India is the 
opposite of that in China.   
 
If the social custom is for the groom’s side to bear a disproportionate share of 
marriage-related expenses (as in China and Korea), the positive impact of the pre-marital 
sex ratio on the household saving rate will be actualized because the groom’s side has to 
save for marriage-related expenses even when the pre-marital sex ratio is balanced and 
will have to save even more for marriage-related expenses if the pre-marital sex ratio is 
unbalanced and they are disadvantaged in the marriage market. 
 
By contrast, if the social custom is for the bride’s side to bear a disproportionate share of 
                                                  
2 Note, however, that there is an endogeneity issue here, with the higher housing prices in China and 
Korea being caused in part by the increased demand for housing caused by the unbalanced pre-marital 
sex ratio (see, example, Wei, Zhang, and Liu, 2015).   
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marriage-related expenses (as in India), the positive impact of the pre-marital sex ratio on 
the household saving rate may not be actualized because it is the bride’s side that bears 
the burden of marriage-related expenses, and even if the pre-marital sex ratio increases 
(the ratio of grooms to brides increases), the groom’s side will not necessarily have to save 
any more than before for marriage-related expenses despite their disadvantaged position 
in the marriage market.  Indeed, as the pre-marital sex ratio increases, the shortage of 
brides will become increasingly acute, which in turn might bid down dowries, reduce the 
marriage-related saving that the bride’s side has to do, and thereby reduce overall 
household saving.  Thus, the impact of the pre-marital sex ratio on the household saving 
rate is theoretically ambiguous, but it could well have a negative impact on the household 
saving rate, the opposite result from countries such as China and Korea where the groom’s 
side bears a disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses.  
 
To summarize, even though the pre-marital sex ratio is unbalanced in favor of males in 
both India and Korea, we would expect the impact of the pre-marital sex ratio to be 
different in the two countries due the differences in social customs regarding which side 
bears the brunt of marriage-related expenses.  We would expect the pre-marital sex ratio 
to have a positive impact on the household saving rate in Korea where the groom’s side 
bears a disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses, and it could well have a 
negative impact on the household saving rate in India, where the bride’s side bears a 
disproportionate share of marriage-related expenses. 
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3. Data on Pre-Marital Sex Ratios and Household Saving Rates in India and Korea 
 
In this section, we present data on the sex ratio of the pre-marital cohort and the 
household saving rate in India and Korea during the 1975-2010 period.  
 
In India, the average age at first marriage was 22.7 for males, 17.7 for females, and 20.2 
for both sexes in 1971 and 26.0 for males, 22.2 for females, and 24.1 for both sexes in 2011 
(all data were taken from Medindia, 2016), and thus the average age at first marriage for 
both sexes presumably averaged about 22 during the 1975-2010 period as a whole.  By 
contrast, in Korea, the average age at first marriage was much later--26.7 for males, 22.8 
for females, and 24.75 for both sexes in 1966 and 32.2 for males, 29.6 for females, and 30.9 
for both sexes in Korea in 2013 (the data for 1966 were taken from Lapierre-Adamcyk and 
Burch (1974) while the data for 2013 were taken from Statistics Korea (2013)), and thus 
the average age at first marriage for both sexes presumably averaged about 28 during the 
1975-2010 period as a whole.  We therefore define the pre-marital cohort as the 10 to 19 
age group in India and the 15 to 24 age group in Korea, reflecting differences in the 
average age at first marriage in the two countries, and calculate SEXRATIO (the sex ratio 
of the pre-marital cohort) as the ratio of males to females for the 10 to 19 age group in the 
case of India and for the 15 to 24 age group in the case of Korea.  It would have been 
preferable to use a different definition of the pre-marital cohort in each year to reflect 
increases over time in the average age at first marriage in the two countries, but we were 
not able to do so because the population data are available only for 5-year age groups.  
Moreover, it would have been preferable to take account of the age difference between 
males and females at first marriage (about 4 to 5 years in India and about 3 to 4 years in 
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Korea), but we were not able to do so for the same reason.   
 
Figures 1-1 and 1-2 show data on trends over time in SEXRATIO (the pre-marital sex ratio, 
the ratio of males to females) in India and Korea, respectively, during the 1975-2010 
period, taken from United Nations (2016), and as can be seen from these figures, this ratio 
was relatively stable in India during this period, fluctuating in the 1.080 to 1.103 range.  
It showed a slight downward trend during the 1975-93 period, declining from 1.094 in 
1975 to 1.080 in 1993, remained stable at 1.080 during the 1993-98 period, and showed a 
slight upward trend during the 1998-2010 period, increasing from 1.080 in 1998 to 1.103 
in 2010.  In Korea, by contrast, the pre-marital sex ratio showed a sharp upward trend 
throughout the 1975-2010 period, increasing from 1.045 in 1975 to 1.127 in 2010.  There 
are at least two possible explanations for this trend.  One is the increasing availability 
and/or affordability of sex determination technology (ultrasonography and amniocentesis) 
and sex-selective abortions (see Guilmoto (2009) and Du and Wei (2013)), and the other is 
that the sharp decline in fertility, combined with strong son preference, caused parents to  
care more about the gender of any given child (see Golley and Tyers (2012) for a discussion 
of the population control policies that were largely responsible for the sharp decline in 
fertility). 
 
Note that the biologically normal sex ratio at birth is 1.05 to 1.06 (105 or 106 males for 
every 100 females).  Thus, the sex ratio in both India and Korea is higher than the 
natural ratio (except until 1983 in Korea), as it is in many, if not most, Asian countries (see 
Guilmoto (2009) for comparative data on sex ratios at birth for a large number of Asian 
countries), suggesting that parents have a strong preference for sons in both countries.  
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Parents presumably operationalized their preference for sons via female infanticide in 
earlier times (observed in some northern Indian states such as Delhi, Haryana, and 
Rajasthan) and by sex-selective abortions (made possible by sex determination technology 
such as ultrasonography and amniocentesis) in more recent times. 3   The crucial 
difference between India and Korea is in trends over time, with Korea showing a much 
more pronounced upward trend in its sex ratio throughout the period of analysis for the 
reasons noted earlier. 
 
Turning to data on the household saving rate, we defined HHSR (the household saving 
rate) as the ratio of net household saving to net household disposable income, where net 
household saving is calculated as the difference between net household disposable income 
and household consumption) (see section 5 for data sources).  Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show 
data on HHSR for India and Korea, respectively, during the 1975-2010 period, and as can 
be seen from these figures, India’s household saving rate has shown a long-term upward 
trend over time, increasing from 9.6% in 1975 to 26.9% in 2010.  By contrast, Korea’s 
household saving rate has been highly volatile over time, fluctuating between 0.4% in 
2002 and 26.0% in 1988 but generally high (above 10%) until 1999 and generally low 
(below 10%) thereafter.  
 
We now compare trends over time in the pre-marital sex ratio to trends over time in the 
household saving rate in India and Korea.  In the case of India, the pre-marital sex ratio 
and the household saving rate showed opposite trends during the 1975-96 period, with the 
                                                  
3 Indeed, Chen, et al. (2013) find using variations across counties in China that access to ultrasound had 
a significant impact on sex ratios at birth, with 40-50% of the increase in sex ratios at birth in China 
being due to improved access to ultrasound. 
11 
 
former showing a downward trend and the latter showing an upward trend, whereas they 
showed similar trends during the 1996-2010 period, with both of them showing upward 
trends.  Since we hypothesized that the pre-marital sex ratio may have a negative impact 
on the household saving rate in the case of India, trends in the pre-marital sex ratio may 
be able to explain trends in the household saving rate during the 1975-96 period but not 
during the 1996-2010 period. 
 
In the case of Korea, the pre-marital sex ratio showed an upward trend throughout the 
1975-2010 period but the household saving rate was volatile during this period.  Since we 
hypothesized that the pre-marital sex ratio will have a positive impact on the household 
saving rate in the case of Korea and since the household saving rate showed an upward 
trend during the 1975-78, 1980-88, 1997-98, 2002-04, and 2008-09 periods, trends in the 
pre-marital sex ratio may be able to explain trends in the household saving rate during 
these periods but not during other periods. 
 
However, we cannot be certain about the impact of the pre-marital sex ratio on the 
household saving rate in the two countries unless we conduct a rigorous regression 
analysis and control for the impact of other factors.  It is to this type of analysis that we 
turn in the remainder of this paper. 
 
4. Estimation Model 
 
In this section, we discuss the estimation model we use in our econometric analysis of the 
determinants of household saving rates in Korea and India.  We start with the most 
12 
 
commonly used specification deriving from the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis 
that posits that the household saving rate is a function of the age structure of the 
population, income levels, corporate saving, etc. and add to it the pre-marital sex ratio  
(see, for example, Modigliani (1970), Feldstein (1977, 1980), Modigliani and Sterling 
(1983), Horioka (1989, 1997), Edwards (1996), Higgins (1998), Loayza, et al. (2000), Chinn 
and Prasad (2003), Luhrman (2003), Bosworth and Chodorow-Reich (2007), Horioka and 
Wan (2007), Kim and Lee (2008), Park and Shin (2009), and Horioka and 
Terada-Hagiwara (2012) for more details; Fafchamps and Pender (1997), Kochar (1999), 
and Athukorala and Sen (2004) for papers on India; and Hurd (1995), Kwack and Lee 
(2005), and Park and Rhee (2005) for papers on Korea).  
 
Thus, the estimation model we use is as follows: 
 
(1)         HHSR(t) = a0 + a1*DEP(t) + a2*AGE(t) + a3*SEXRATIO(t) + a4*PCY(t) + 
a5*CORPSAV(t) + a6*POP1519(t) + a7*TREND(t) + e(t), 
 
where HHSR = the household saving rate (defined as the ratio of net household saving to 
net household disposable income) 
      DEP = the youth dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of the young population (the 
population aged 0 to 14 in the case of India and the population aged 0 to 19 in the case of 
Korea) to the working-age population (the population aged 15 to 59 in the case of India 
and the population aged 20 to 64 in the case of Korea) 
      AGE = the aged dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of the aged population (the 
population aged 60 and older in the case of India and the population aged 65 and older in 
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the case of Korea) to the working-age population  
      SEXRATIO = the sex ratio (the ratio of males to females) of the pre-marital cohort 
(defined as the 10 to 19 age group in India and the 15 to 24 age group in Korea, for the 
reasons explained earlier). 
PCY = per capita real net household disposable income 
CORPSAV = the ratio of net corporate saving to net household disposable income 
      POP1519 = the ratio of the pre-college population (the population aged 15 to 19) to 
the working-age population (the population aged 20 to 64) (included only in the case of 
Korea for the reasons given below) 
      TREND = a time trend 
      e = an error term  
 
DEP and AGE are meant to capture the impact of the age structure of the population and 
are included in virtually all aggregate saving rate regressions.  The life cycle hypothesis 
predicts that both coefficients will be negative since the aggregate household saving rate 
should be lower, the higher is the ratio of the dependent (young or aged) population to the 
working-age population.  The dependent and working-age populations are defined 
differently in India and Korea to reflect differences in college entrance rates (higher in 
Korea than in India) and retirement ages (later in Korea than in India). 
 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, one would expect the coefficient of PCY to be 
positive since households should be able to afford to save more if their income levels are 
higher, and one would expect the coefficient of CORPSAV to be negative if households see 
through the corporate veil and reduce their own saving in response to increases in 
14 
 
corporate saving. 
 
Yet another demographic variable of possible importance in societies that place value on 
education is POP1519 (the ratio of pre-college children (the population aged 15 to 19) to 
the working-age population (the population aged 20 to 64)).  More specifically, in a society 
in which college expenses are high, one would expect parents with pre-college children to 
save for their children’s college expenses and therefore that the aggregate household 
saving rate will be higher, the higher is the share of parents with pre-college children.  By 
contrast, in a society in which pre-college expenses such as the expenses of cram schools, 
private tutoring, etc., are high, one would expect parents with pre-college children to have 
to draw down their savings in order to pay for such expenses and therefore that the 
aggregate household saving rate will be lower, the higher is the share of parents with 
pre-college children (see Horioka (1985) for an analysis of saving for education in Japan).  
This variable was included only in the case of Korea because its coefficient was not 
significant when included in the regressions for India, perhaps because educational 
expenses are not as important in India as they are in Korea, which in turn may be due 
partly to the fact that the practice of sending pre-college students to cram schools, hiring 
private tutors for them, etc., is far less common in India and partly to the fact that a much 
lower proportion of the young go to college in India.4  As of 2010, 39.8% of the population 
aged 25 and above had completed tertiary level education in Korea whereas the 
corresponding figure for India was still only 9.1%, according to data from Barro and Lee 
(2016).  
                                                  
4 The regression results for India with the POP1519 variable included are available upon request from 
the authors. 
15 
 
 
5. Data Sources 
 
In this section, we describe the data sources from which our data were taken.   
 
National accounts data for Korea on the net saving and net disposable income of 
households and non-profit institutions serving households and net corporate saving 
(needed to calculate HHSR, PCY, and CORPSAV) were taken from Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2016), while similar data for India were taken 
from CEIC data manager, WEB (New York, N.Y.), which in turn were taken from Central 
Statistics Office (2016).  
 
In both countries, PCY was calculated by dividing net household disposable income by 
total population, then deflating by the price deflator for private consumption expenditure.  
In the case of India, the price deflator was obtained by dividing nominal private 
consumption expenditure by real private consumption expenditure using data from 
Central Statistics Office (2016).  In the case of Korea, the price deflator was taken 
directly from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016). 
 
DEP, AGE, SEXRATIO, and POP1519 were calculated using data taken from United 
Nations (2016).  
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6. Estimation Results 
 
In this section, we present our estimation results. 
 
6.1. Time Series Properties of the Variables 
 
We tested the variables used in our analysis for unit roots using the Dickey-Fuller test, 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, KPSS test, and Zivot-Harvey test (see Dickey and Fuller 
(1979), Kwiatkowski, et al. (1992), Zivot and Andrews (1992), and Harvey, Leybourne, and 
Taylor (2013)).  The detailed test results are not shown due to space limitations, but we 
found that all of the variables used in our analysis are non-stationary.  In particular, 
most or all tests showed that HHSR, PCY, and CORPSAV are I(1) and that DEP, AGE, 
SEXRATIO, and CREDIT are I(2) or I(3) in the case of India.  Similarly, most or all tests 
showed that HHSR, CORPSAV, and CREDIT are I(1), that SEXRATIO and FINA are I(1) 
or I(2), that DEP and AGE are I(2) or I(3), and that the degrees of integration of PCY and 
POP1519 are not clear in the case of Korea. Thus, there is a real danger that ordinary 
least squares will lead to spurious correlations, and the use of cointegration techniques is 
clearly warranted. 
  
6.2. Results of the Tests for Cointegration  
 
We tested for cointegration using the Engle-Granger test (Engle and Granger (1987)), the 
KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, et al. (1992)), and the Johansen test (Johansen (1988, 1991) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1990)).  Looking first at the results of the Engle-Granger test and 
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the KPSS test (see Tables 1-1 and 1-2), the results for all specifications for both countries 
indicate the presence of cointegration, implying the presence of a long-term relationship 
among the variables.     
 
Turning to the results of the Johansen test (not shown due to space limitations), the trace 
test as well as the maximum eigenvalue test indicate the presence of cointegration in both 
countries for all specifications.  As for the number of cointegrating vectors, the trace test 
as well as the maximum eigenvalue test indicate the presence of 2 to 5 cointegrating 
vectors in the case of India and 2 to 4 cointegrating vectors in the case of Korea.  A priori 
we would expect to find only one cointegrating vector and it is well-known that the 
Johansen test will lead to an upward bias in cointegrating rank in small samples (see, for 
example, Cheung and Lai (1993) and Johansen (2002)).  Thus, when estimating the 
cointegrating vector, we constrained the number of vectors to be one. 
 
6.3. The Determinants of Household Saving Rates in India and Korea 
 
In this subsection, we present our estimates of the cointegrating vector, which shed light 
on the determinants of the household saving rate in India and Korea.  The results for 
India are shown in Table 2-1, and as can be seen from this table, the coefficient of 
SEXRATIO is negative and significant in both variants, as expected.  As for the 
coefficients of the other variables, the coefficients of AGE and DEP are negative and 
significant, as predicted by the life cycle hypothesis, the coefficient of PCY is positive and 
significant, as expected, the coefficient of CORPSAV is negative and significant, as 
expected, and the coefficient of TREND is negative and significant, indicating a downward 
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trend in the household saving rate. 
 
The results for Korea are shown in Table 2-2, and as can be seen from this table, the 
coefficient of SEXRATIO is positive and significant in every variant, as expected.  As for 
the coefficients of the other variables, the coefficient of DEP is always negative and 
significant, as expected, but the coefficient of AGE is always positive and significant in all 
but one variant, contrary to expectation.  Perhaps this is because Koreans continue to 
save even after retirement because they are risk-averse (and concerned in particular about 
longevity risk) and/or because they want to leave a bequest to their children.  The 
coefficient of PCY is positive and significant, as expected, the coefficient of CORPSAV is 
positive and significant, contrary to expectation, the coefficient of POP1519 is negative 
and significant, presumably because the cost of cram schools, private tutoring, and other 
expenses of pre-college students lowers the saving rate of households with pre-college 
children, and the coefficient of TREND is negative and significant, indicating a downward 
trend in the household saving rate.  
 
Thus, the results are highly satisfactory, in general, and provide support for the life cycle 
hypothesis in both India and Korea, and in particular, the coefficient of SEXRATIO has 
the expected sign (negative in India and positive in Korea) and is always significant in 
both countries.  This suggests that the “competitive saving hypothesis” of Wei and Zhang 
(2011a) and Du and Wei (2013) applies not only in China but also in India and Korea and 
that unbalanced pre-marital sex ratios elevate the household saving rate. 
 
We turn now to the implications of our findings for whether trends over time in the 
19 
 
pre-marital sex ratio can explain trends over time in the household saving rate in India 
and Korea.  Looking first at the case of India, the negative impact of the pre-marital sex 
ratio on the household saving rate implies that the downward trend in the pre-marital sex 
ratio until 1993 can explain the upward trend in the household saving rate until 1993 but 
that the upward trend in the pre-marital sex ratio after 1998 cannot explain the 
continuing upward trend in the household saving rate after 1998.5 
 
Looking next at the case of Korea, the positive impact of the pre-marital sex ratio on the 
household saving rate implies that the upward trend in the pre-marital sex ratio 
throughout the 1975-2011 period can explain the upward trend in the household saving 
rate until 1998 but not the downward trend therein after 1998.6 
 
Turning next to whether the level of the pre-marital sex ratio can explain the level of the 
household saving rate in India and Korea, the fact that the pre-marital sex ratio has a 
negative impact on the household saving rate in India and the fact that the India’s 
pre-marital sex ratio is higher than average imply that India’s household saving rate 
                                                  
5 If the coefficient of the pre-marital sex ratio became positive after 1998, the upward trend in the 
pre-marital sex ratio after 1998 would be able to explain the upward trend in the household saving rate, 
but when we tried introducing an interactive term between SEXRATIO and a dummy variable that 
equals one for all years after 1997 and zero otherwise, we found that the coefficient of SEXRATIO not 
only remained negative after 1997 but that its absolute magnitude increased even further. 
 
6 If the coefficient of the pre-marital sex ratio became negative after 1998, the upward trend in the 
pre-marital sex ratio after 1998 would be able to explain the downward trend in the household saving 
rate, but when we tried introducing an interactive term between SEXRATIO and a dummy variable that 
equals one for all years after 1997 and zero otherwise, we found that the coefficient of SEXRATIO not 
only remained positive after 1997 but that its absolute magnitude increased even further. 
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should be lower than average.  Thus, India’s pre-marital sex ratio cannot explain India’s 
higher than average household saving rate. 
 
Turning to the case of Korea, the fact that the pre-marital sex ratio has a positive impact 
on the household saving rate and the fact that Korea’s pre-marital sex ratio was below 
average until 1983 and above average thereafter implies that her household saving rate 
should have been below average until 1983 and above average after 1983.  Thus, the 
pre-marital sex ratio can explain the high level of Korea’s household saving rate during 
the 1984-2000 period but not the high level thereof before 1984 nor the low level thereof 
after 2000. 
 
As for the impact of the age structure of the population, since DEP was found to have a 
negative impact on India’s household saving rate, the steady decline in DEP during the 
period of analysis can help explain the steady increase in India’s household saving rate 
during this period.  AGE was also found to have a negative impact on India’s household 
saving rate, but since it increased only slowly during the period of analysis, it did not have 
an appreciable impact on trends over time in India’s household saving rate during this 
period, and India’s household saving rate showed a steady increase despite the slight 
downward pressure exerted on it by the slow increase in AGE. 
 
In the case of Korea, both DEP and AGE exerted upward pressure on the household saving 
rate during the period of analysis because DEP declined over time and has a negative 
impact on the household saving rate while AGE increased over time and has a positive 
impact on the household saving rate.  Thus, trends in the age structure of the population 
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can explain the upward trend in Korea’s household saving rate during the 1975-78, 
1980-88, 1997-98, 2002-04, and 2008-09 periods but cannot explain trends in Korea’s 
household saving rate during other periods.7 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we estimated a household saving rate equation for India and Korea using 
long-term time series data for the 1975-2010 period, focusing in particular on the impact 
of the pre-marital sex (or gender) ratio (the ratio of males to females) on the household 
saving rate.  To summarize the main findings of the paper, it found that the pre-marital 
sex ratio has a significant impact on the household saving rate in both India and Korea, 
even after controlling for the usual suspects such as the aged and youth dependency ratios 
and income.  It has a negative impact in India, where the bride’s side has to pay 
substantial dowries to the groom’s side at marriage, but a positive impact in Korea, where, 
as in China, the groom’s side has to bear a disproportionate share of marriage-related 
expenses including purchasing a house or condominium for the newlywed couple.  The 
                                                  
7 Finally, we estimated an error correction model to analyze the short-run dynamics of household saving 
behavior.  The results are not shown in detail because they were not very satisfactory, but we provide a 
brief summary here.  In the case of India, virtually none of the coefficients including that of the error 
correction term were significant.  In the case of Korea, the coefficient of the error correction term was 
negative and significant in some cases, indicating some tendency to return to equilibrium after a 
deviation.  None of the other coefficients were consistently significant, and moreover, their signs were 
almost always contrary to expectation.  These results suggest that the variables included in the analysis 
cannot adequately explain short-run household saving behavior, which is not surprising because most of 
the variables included in the analysis are variables that would be expected to have a longer-term impact 
on household saving behavior. 
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findings of the paper imply that trends in the pre-marital sex ratio can explain trends in 
the household saving rate during the first half of the sample period but not during the 
second half in both countries and that the level of the pre-marital sex ratio can partly 
explain the high level of Korea’s household saving rate but not the high level of India’s 
household saving rate. 
 
In sum, unbalanced pre-marital sex ratios combined with excessive and asymmetric 
marriage-related expenses have distorted the saving behavior of households in both 
countries.  Du and Wei (2013) conduct a welfare analysis using numerical calibration 
methods and show that, in China, the welfare of males decreases while that of females 
increases and that social welfare (the sum of the welfare of all males and all females) 
decreases as the sex ratio increases.  Thus, the welfare of males as well as social welfare 
could be increased by bringing the sex ratio back into balance in Korea, where marriage 
customs are similar to those in China, and conversely in India, where marriage customs 
are the opposite of those in China. 
 
Another policy implication relates to saving-investment imbalances and current account 
imbalances.  Wei and Zhang (2011a) and Du and Wei (2013) show that more than half of 
the increase in China’s household saving rate was due to the sharp increase in the 
pre-marital sex ratio and that about half of China’s current account surplus was due to her 
unbalanced sex ratio.  Similarly, saving distortions caused by unbalanced sex ratios may 
very well affect saving-investment imbalances and current account imbalances in India 
and Korea as well.   
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A related policy implication of our results relate to the so-called worldwide saving glut.  
Our results imply that the imbalanced sex ratios in India and Korea are causing India’s 
household saving rate to be lower than it would be otherwise and Korea’s household 
saving rate to be higher than it would be otherwise.  Thus, the net impact of imbalanced 
sex ratios on worldwide saving is ambiguous. 
 
Turning finally to how to reduce or eliminate the distortions in household saving behavior 
caused by unbalanced pre-marital sex ratios in the first place, there are at least 3 possible 
ways: (1) to eliminate son (or daughter) preference, (2) to relax or abolish population 
control measures, and (3) to reduce excessive and asymmetric marriage-related expenses.   
 
There is a long tradition of son preference in Asian societies because the eldest son 
traditionally carries on the family line or the family business, and it is therefore not easy 
to weaken this long-held tradition.  However, Das Gupta, et al. (2009) argues that Korea 
did precisely that through direct policy measures although Hvistendahl (2011) disputes 
this claim (see Golley and Tyers (2014)), and thus weakening son preference is a 
potentially effective way of eliminating the distortions in household saving behavior 
caused by unbalanced sex ratios. 
 
Turning to population control measures, they have been implemented in many developing 
countries as a way of keeping population growth down and raising living standards, but 
the most extreme example is the one-child policy in China (see Golley and Tyers (2012) for 
an excellent overview of population control measures in China and India).  Relaxing or 
abolishing population control measures would enable parents to have the desired number 
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of children and, at the same time, eliminate the distortions in household saving behavior 
caused by unbalanced sex ratios, thereby enabling two birds to be killed with one stone.  
The Chinese government’s relaxation of its one-child policy in rural areas and certain 
cities in the early 1980s (see Golley and Tyers (2012)) and its sudden decision to abolish 
the one-child policy altogether starting in 2016 are examples of policies that weakened or 
abolished population control measures. 
 
Finally, the marriage customs that led to excessive and asymmetric marriage-related 
expenses have a long tradition and hence would be hard to change, but abolishing such 
customs would reduce the financial burden on parents of newlyweds and, at the same time, 
eliminate the distortions in household saving behavior caused by unbalanced sex ratios, 
thereby enabling two birds to be killed with one stone.  India’s efforts to prohibit dowries 
via legal means is one example of such a policy. 
 
Moreover, policies to weaken son preference and policies to reduce excessive and 
asymmetric marriage-related expenses would also lead to greater gender equality, which 
in turn would lead to a decline in sex-selective abortions and infanticide and in the 
dowry-related harassment and even murder of women, and hence would be beneficial for 
that reason as well. 
 
Thus, policies to eliminate son (or daughter) preference, to relax or abolish population 
control measures, and to reduce excessive and asymmetric marriage-related expenses are 
highly beneficial because they would not only eliminate the distortions in household 
saving behavior caused by unbalanced sex ratios but also because they would allow 
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parents to have the optimal number of children, reduce the financial burden of 
marriage-related expenses, and achieve greater gender equality.  
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Figure 1-1: Trends over Time in the Pre-Marital Sex Ratio in India 
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Figure 1-2: Trends over Time in the Pre-Marital Sex Ratio in Korea 
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Notes: The pre-marital sex ratio is calculated as the ratio of males to females in the 
pre-marital cohort (defined as the 10-19 age group in the case of India and the 15-24 age 
group in the case of Korea).  The data are taken from United Nations (2016). 
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Figure 2-1: Trends over Time in the Household Saving Rate in India 
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Figure 2-2: Trends over Time in the Household Saving Rate in Korea 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Ho
use
ho
ld s
avi
ng 
rat
e (
%)
Year
 
Notes: The household saving rate is computed as the ratio of net household saving to net 
disposable household income (in percent).  The data are taken from Central Statistics 
Office (2016) in the case of India and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2016) in the case of Korea. 
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Specification Type of test Time period Number of obs Statistic
DEP, AGE, SEXRATIO,
PCY DF 1975-2010 35 -3.389**
ADF(1) 1976-2010 34 -2.757*
ADF(2) 1977-2010 33 -3.082**
KPSS0 1975-2010 35 0.0846
KPSS1 1976-2010 34 0.0581
KPSS2 1977-2010 33 0.0476
DEP, AGE, SEXRATIO,
PCY, CORPSAV DF 1975-2010 35 -3.533**
ADF(1) 1976-2010 34 -2.773*
ADF(2) 1977-2010 33 -3.088**
KPSS0 1975-2010 35 0.083
KPSS1 1976-2010 34 0.0583
KPSS2 1977-2010 33 0.048
Table 1-1: Results of Engle-Granger and KPSS Cointegration Tests for India
 
Notes: This table shows the results of Engle-Granger and KPSS tests for cointegration for 
India.  Refer to the main text for variable definitions, data sources, and details on these 
tests.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Specification Type of test Time period Number of obs. Statistic
DEP, AGE, SEXRATIO,
PCY DF 1976-2010 35 -2.933*
ADF(1) 1977-2010 34 -3.130**
ADF(2) 1978-2010 33 -2.522
KPSS0 1976-2010 35 0.227
KPSS1 1977-2010 34 0.143
KPSS2 1978-2010 33 0.119
DEP, AGE, SEXRATIO,
PCY, CORPSAV DF 1976-2010 35 -3.498**
ADF(1) 1977-2010 34 -3.569**
ADF(2) 1978-2010 33 -3.340**
KPSS0 1976-2010 35 0.156
KPSS1 1977-2010 34 0.106
KPSS2 1978-2010 33 0.094
DEP, AGE, PCY,
SEXRATIO, POP1519 DF 1976-2010 35 0.094
ADF(1) 1977-2010 34 -4.975***
ADF(2) 1978-2010 33 -5.267***
KPSS0 1976-2010 35 0.0382
KPSS1 1977-2010 34 0.0291
KPSS2 1978-2010 33 0.0306
DEP, AGE, SEXRATIO,
PCY, POP1519, CORPSAV DF 1976-2010 35 -3.938***
ADF(1) 1977-2010 34 -5.368***
ADF(2) 1978-2010 33 -4.595***
KPSS0 1976-2010 35 0.0465
KPSS1 1977-2010 34 0.0342
KPSS2 1978-2010 33 0.0363
Table 1-2: Results of Engle-Granger and KPSS Cointegration Tests for Korea
  
Notes: This table shows the results of Engle-Granger and KPSS tests for cointegration for 
Korea.  Refer to the main text for variable definitions, data sources, and details on these 
tests.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Variable
DEP -32.976 *** -10.949 ***
-8.11 -75.74
AGE -176.326 *** -147.382 ***
-6.71 -116.67
SEXRATIO -95.957 *** -12.868 ***
-11.06 -45.81
PCY 500.234 *** 164.063 ***
13.60 162.06
CORPSAV -1.621 ***
-72.92
TREND -29.307 *** -4.748 ***
-11.30 -61.91
Constant 14394.880 -3622.178
Sample period 1979-2010 1979-2010
No. of obs. 32 32
Table 2-1: The Determinants of Household Saving in India
Model 1 Model 2
 
Notes: This table shows the cointegrating vector estimated using the Johansen method 
with 4 lags.  The dependent variable is the household saving rate.  Refer to the main 
text for variable definitions and data sources.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Variable
DEP -2.439 ** -5.552 *** -14.466 *** -5.532 ***
-2.16 -27.23 -72.44 -8.52
AGE 8.396 27.697 *** 71.753 *** 20.347 ***
1.44 26.41 77.84 7.87
SEXRATIO 3.705 *** 8.740 *** 27.575 *** 5.728 ***
2.72 40.06 52.70 4.15
PCY 50.533 *** 117.770 *** 255.900 *** 111.328 ***
3.69 45.97 76.30 11.69
CORPSAV 0.460 *** 0.450 ***
15.26 3.28
POP1519 -0.035 *** -0.033 ***
-18.33 -5.42
TREND -9.962 * -28.600 *** -72.134 *** -24.900 ***
-1.89 -30.10 -74.12 -8.64
Constant -635.572 -1452.321 -3894.049 -923.198
Sample period 1979-2010 1979-2010 1979-2010 1979-2010
No. of obs. 32 32 32 32
Table 2-2: The Determinants of Household Saving in Korea
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
Notes: This table shows the cointegrating vector estimated using the Johansen method 
with 4 lags.  The dependent variable is the household saving rate.  Refer to the main 
text for variable definitions and data sources.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
